“[I]n such a world of conflict, a world of victims and executioners, it is the job of thinking people, not to be on the side of the executioners”.

Albert Camus

The crisis in Darfur has three components that must be addressed in a peacekeeping strategy:

1. The direct violence by the armed protagonist (in this case the GOS and the Janjaweed),
2. The humanitarian crisis which has arisen from the crisis and
3. The group based grievances or incompatibility of interests that led to the conflict originally.

The violence is always the first priority as it directly obstructs the implementation of peace strategies to address the following issues. To deal with violence, there are various paths that can be taken. The first is direct military action. In the current political landscape (with the United States militarily overextended) direct action by forces from outside the region is not an option. This is partly due to the limited resources of NATO and the UN (the EU has no armed collective troops), and is partially due to apprehension on the part of the US. As in most African conflicts, the United States is slow to deploy troops as the administration has noted the difficulty of selling the general public on another humanitarian mission that could potentially be “another Somalia”. Although this is not the case, the concept of “selling” something to the American public does bring to light the importance of the general public’s response to the genocide. If the public was more than neutral and was determined that the US takes some form of action, the US government may have more of an incentive to act). The limited capacity and decision to not take military action on the part of various parties against the Sudanese government leaves the issue of violence to be addressed in another manner.

Peacekeeping must directly address the issue of violence but does not need to rely solely on military action. It is important to have peacekeeping forces (which is where the AU plays a vital role) but the use of economic or trade sanctions, withdrawal of financial assistance, divestment from companies supporting the GOS, limiting international travel, and imposing no-fly zones over the region of Darfur would all be ways to press the GOS to halting the violence. Each of these actions does not require deployment of troops, and yet could be extremely helpful. If the international community stood in solidarity against human rights abuses such as these, there would be a decreased marginal return on civil conflict. I do not think that these forms or political pressure can work alone to address the humanitarian aspect of the situation. Unfortunately the Sudanese government has not respected the ceasefire and continues to commit crimes against humanity. It is my opinion that these atrocities will not stop and cannot be monitored without a peacekeeping force on the ground.

Assessing the magnitude of the crisis I believe that it was and still is essential to support the African Union troops. This support should come from all respective players, to help meet the requests issued by the AU troops. The recent commitment from NATO to assist the AU with logistical support and training is a step in the right direction and the EU collaboration will help make this possible. It is critical that the AU troops get assistance and reinforcement to expand their presence in the area. Addressing the ongoing violence that the IDP’s experience will help the people in the region move towards a more viable existence. Without the ability to return home, with their villages burnt and many wells bombed, the impending famine will lead to an even larger crisis. The issues of famine and coming rain (which will limit the ability of aid workers to bring food into the area) increase the urgency of the situation. The AU troops have been able to bring relative security to a few locations, although this does not mean that the IDP’s are safe if they leave the camp, it does provide for a smaller amount of stability. Once the AU has been bolstered, there should be an increased stability in the region, which will hopefully facilitate the last component of the conflict resolution.

Diplomacy and negotiations will be necessary to address the core disagreements between the GOS and the rebel groups who initiated the conflict in early 2003. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) will need to be engaged in peace negotiations with the government of Khartoum as the region of Darfur was originally left out of the peace negotiations that surrounded the north/south conflict. International mediators who have been meeting to address the issues of the twenty-year north/south conflict would be advised to work along side the AU commission to address conflict in Darfur. “The Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Sudan, Jan Pronk, his Principal Deputy, Taye Zerihoun, and other senior officials of the UN mission will head (June 9th) to Abuja, Nigeria. They will attend the talks between the Government of Sudan and the two rebel groups of Darfur, which are scheduled to start on Friday,” Stephane Dujarric told journalists at UN Headquarters.

As peace talks begin between the two groups, the skills of unbiased mediation will be crucial to moving the situation forward. Ideally these groups will be able to sign a ceasefire with provisions for accountability that will increase the likelihood of an effective peace negotiation. There will undoubtedly be a need for economic incentives to bring the parties to a point of negotiation. The interests of the opposing parties will need to be looked at closely in order to address on going strife in the Darfur region between the pastoralists and the agriculturalists. The need for a viable system of economic subsistence will also be a key thing to address in negotiations. In the process of negotiations, the mediator (at this point the AU) will not be able to act as a representative of the international law. The conflict between mediation and international law investigations would compromise the ability of the mediator to bring viable options to the table. For this reason, the peace negations will need to continue (once a ceasefire has been signed) without a connection to the ICC investigations into the war crimes committed in Darfur. As a potential point of leverage, the ICC’s finding may be negated in order to increase the incentive for the GOS to cooperate in the negotiations.

Conclusion

The fact that a crisis involving crimes against humanity can continue for years on end is a reflection on the international community’s lack of seriousness regarding peace keeping and the protection of basic human rights. The individuals who represent states through leadership positions in the previously mentioned groups, act in the interest of their states alone, and thus miss the very important principles of conflict management. In the aftermath of many genocides it has been said that if a government or group can slaughter one race, why couldn’t another slaughter you or me? And this is unfortunately the reality of large scale, government sponsored killing. Without a large outcry from the international community, a government is free to kill its own people with almost all certainty that the humanitarian community will come and give aid to the dieing without challenging the regime. This at large, has been the case for Darfur. The conflict management methods that have been used have not been effective enough to stop the daily atrocities on the ground. What could have been done differently? What actions should be taken now? These questions are important but come at a time when the face of the conflict has changed from a large-scale government backed counter insurgency to a mass humanitarian crisis with endless abuse of human rights. The changing face of conflicts is important to keep in mind, as it requires dynamic and continues assessment by peacekeepers to determine and address the new and developing facets of a crisis. In Darfur, the new face of the conflict are the 2.5 million people who have been displaced and denied basic food, water, shelter and security. These are the people who conflict management and peace creation is for. It should be for each one of those faces that we examine power plays and economic incentives and strategies to prevent this from happening again.